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INTRODUCTION
“Geniuses, just as the stars, must shine without pay.” So goes
the Swiss saying on the morality and justice of financial awards for
inventors.1 Similarly, a memorandum submitted to the Swiss
*

Law degree, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, 1988; LL.M. in Trade
Regulation, New York University School of Law, New York, N.Y., 2002. All
translations in this Article are the author’s own.
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government circa 1884 by a group of industrialists pleads “[t]hat in
the interest of the general prosperity of industry and trade, patent
protection, that cup of sorrows, may pass from [us].”2
With such strong public feeling against patent protection it is
no wonder that it took Switzerland—a conservative country where
national referenda often determine important policy decisions3—
almost half a century to enact its first national patent law in 1888.4
The law was so limited in scope, however, that its usefulness for
patent protection was at best dubious.5 Indeed, successful
lobbying by the Swiss chemical industry resulted in the 1888
national patent law protecting only inventions that could be
represented by mechanical models.6 Two decades and some
international pressure were necessary for the legislature to rectify
this Swiss anomaly.7 One explanation for this long and laborious
legislative history can be found in the Swiss constitutional
requirements. Switzerland is a federal state with a strict separation
of powers between the confederation and the cantons, and a patent
law on a national scale could not be enacted by the federal
government in the absence of constitutionally granted authority.8
It was only after three attempts that in 1887 such a constitutional
mandate was successfully given by the Swiss citizens to the
1

Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,
10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 17 (1950) (quoting WILHELM ROSCHER, 3 SYSTEM DER
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT 758 (Stuttgart 1881)).
2
ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS,
1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907, at 87 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971).
3
See generally BBC News, Country Profile: Switzerland, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1035212.stm (last visited Jan.
28, 2004) (noting that “[u]niquely in Europe, important policy decisions often rest on the
results of national referenda” and that “the Swiss Confederation’s long-standing neutral
status has given it political stability that has helped it become one of the world’s
wealthiest countries”).
4
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86.
6
Economic historian Eric Schiff calls the period between 1888 and 1907, when the first
Swiss national patent law was in effect, “the semi-patentless interlude.” Id. at 86. He also
refers to the 1888 law as “probably the most incomplete and selective patent law ever
enacted in modern times.” Id. at 93.
6
Id. at 85–86.
7
See id. at 94–95 (noting that in 1907 the Swiss legislature enacted a law that
eliminated the “mechanical model” requirement and extended protection to chemical
processes after pressure from Germany, the biggest market for Swiss chemical products).
8
Id. at 85.
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confederation.9 The fourth vote, in 1905, was then necessary to
expunge the Swiss constitution (“Constitution”) of the previous
error by removing the “mechanical model” requirement from the
Constitution—where it never should have been in the first place.10
Indeed, as patent protection became more prevalent in neighboring
countries, international opinion turned against Switzerland’s
industries, which were considered thieves because it was common
practice among Swiss manufacturers to use foreign inventions.11
This phenomenon reached its peak during the semi-patentless era
when Swiss chemical industries were not only still imitating
German inventions, but also exporting the imitated substances to
Germany.12 It was only when both the Constitution and the Swiss
law were modified that it was possible for Switzerland to enter an
era of patent protection with a true patent law.13
The multilateral trade system established by the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) agreements, the successor to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), includes the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (“TRIPS
Agreement”), which entered into force on January 1, 1995.14 The
TRIPS Agreement was called “the most ambitious international
intellectual property convention ever attempted.”15 It provides for
minimal requirements for its members to implement for the
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property, which
covers copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical
indications,
industrial
designs,
patents,
layout-designs
(topographies of integrated circuits), as well as the protection of

9

See id.
See id. at 86.
11
See id. at 94.
12
See id.
13
See id. at 86.
14
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
15
J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly
Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 366 (1996).
10
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undisclosed information.16 The TRIPS Agreement also contains
measures and procedures designed to enforce those requirements.17
Because not all WTO member countries are at the same stage of
development—there are the developed countries, the developing
countries, and the least developed countries—the TRIPS
Agreement grants different transition periods for the
implementation of its obligations.18 Although Switzerland’s
economic and political situation differs from the current conditions
in developing countries, its patent history is comparable to the
challenges that developing countries face in the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement.19 Indeed, the main difference is that
nineteenth-century Switzerland, like the other major European
countries after the industrial revolution, was making the transition
from an agricultural-based to an industrial-based economy.20
History indicates that Switzerland’s position was peculiar because,
unlike its neighbors, it did not have any natural resources.21 This
did not prevent Switzerland from moving into large-scale industrial
production, however.22 In addition, although Switzerland did not
have a true patent protection system for a long period of time, it
joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (“Paris Convention”) voluntarily,23 unlike the developing
countries that entered the Uruguay Round as part of a broader
“package deal.”24
16

Id. at 366 n.12. A summary of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) objectives and requirements is
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement (last
visited Feb. 9, 2004).
17
See Reichman, supra note 15, at 368–69.
18
Id. at 365 n.8; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 65–66.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 195–199.
20
See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 96.
21
See id. at 97; see also Harold R. Newman, The Mineral Industry of Switzerland, 2002
MINERALS Y.B. (U.S. Geological Survey) vol. III, at 23.1, available at
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/europe.html#sz (last visited Feb. 9,
2004).
22
See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 97.
23
Switzerland joined the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property
on July 7, 1884. See WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Contracting Parties, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/index.html (last updated
Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter WIPO, Paris Convention Parties].
24
See, e.g., Adronico Oduogo Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement:
Origins and History of Negotiations, July 30, 2001 (presented at the Eastern and

RITTER FORMAT

2004]

3/31/2004 4:14 PM

THE HISTORY OF SWISS PATENT LAW

467

Part I of this Article will provide a brief description of the
general requirements under the TRIPS Agreements for its member
countries with regard to patent law. Part II will recount and
discuss the legislative history of Switzerland’s patent laws, while
Part III will present the arguments invoked by the industries that
have opposed patent protection. Part IV will also briefly examine
from an ethical perspective the conduct of the Swiss industries that
imitated foreign patented inventions during the patentless era
(before 1888). The final part will analyze the similarities and
differences in today’s North-South debate and yesterday’s
controversy between Switzerland and the members of the Paris
Convention.
I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
WTO members are required, under article 1 of the TRIPS
Agreement, to implement minimal intellectual property protections
that are defined within the agreement.25 Article 2 mandates that
they comply with articles 1 through 12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention, as embodied in the Stockholm Act of 1967,26 the
purpose of which is to grant national treatment to all nationals of
countries of the European Union in all the industrial property rights
covered.27 An essential principle embodied in article 4 of the Paris
Convention is the right of priority for patents.28 The Paris
Convention does not, however, contain any specification as to the
scope of patent protection, leaving this choice to the European
Union members.29
Southern Africa Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual Property and
Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya), available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/200107-30/30-07-01-docu.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
25
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.
26
See id. art. 2.
27
Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as
revised July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2004).
28
See id. art. 4.
29
See, e.g., Dr. Harriet Strimpel, Patents Promote the Useful Arts in a Free Market,
Center for International Development at Harvard University, at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments42.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
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The TRIPS Agreement differs in that article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement defines a minimal standard of patentable subject matter
by specifying that the “patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application.”30 This article further
provides that there shall be no discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology, and whether the products are
imported or locally produced.31 The definition was modeled after
the standards of the developed countries, and contains few
narrowly defined exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the article.32
Inventions may be excluded if their commercial exploitation
violates the ordre public or morality of a given member country.33
Moreover, if use is inconsistent with diagnostic, therapeutic, and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans, animals, plants, and
other organisms excluding micro-organisms, or is inconsistent with
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other
than non-biological and microbiological processes, such inventions
may also be excluded.34 It is important to note that under the
TRIPS Agreement, plant varieties are not included in these
exceptions and must be protected by a patent or a special system.35
The TRIPS Agreement has other minimal requirements, such as
the twenty-year term of a patent,36 judicial review for the
revocation or forfeiture of a patent,37 permission for member
countries to require compulsory licenses subject to certain
conditions,38 and effective enforcement by the member countries
of any of the intellectual property rights covered by the
agreement.39

30

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.
Id.
32
See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions
About Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001).
33
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. art. 33 (specifying that the twenty-year duration begins at the filing date).
37
Id. art. 32.
38
Id. art. 31.
39
Id. art. 42.
31
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According to article 65, member countries have one year from
the entry into effect of the TRIPS Agreement—that is, until
January 1, 1996—to implement these minimal requirements.40 The
developing countries are entitled to four additional years in order
to harmonize their legislation with the TRIPS Agreement
standards.41 The four-year period benefits members moving from
a centrally-planned economy into a market, free-enterprise
economy who undertake structural reform of their intellectual
property system and face special problems in the preparation and
implementation of the intellectual property laws.42 Furthermore, if
a member country is obligated to introduce patent protection to
areas of technology not previously protected within its territory, it
may delay the initiation of such protection for an additional period
of five years.43 Pursuant to article 70 paragraph 8, however, a
member country not offering patent protection for pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical products in its national law on January 1,
1995 shall, during the transitional period, provide a means by
which patent applications for such inventions can be filed—the socalled “mailbox” provision.44 Finally, pursuant to article 66, the
least developed countries are entitled to a transition period of
eleven years from the date of entry into force, which can be
extended upon duly motivated request.45
The WTO is novel because of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (“DSU”), annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization,46 and the applicable
TRIPS Agreement dispute settlement process pursuant to article
64.47 The members have an enforcement mechanism at last. As
stated in article 23(2) of the DSU, any unilateral trade sanctions

40

Id. art. 65.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. art. 70.
45
Id. art. 66.
46
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO
Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
47
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 64.
41
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from a WTO member against another for the failure to implement
the TRIPS Agreement is prohibited:
[Members shall] not make a determination to the effect that
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements has been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules
and procedures of this Understanding . . . and [shall] obtain
[Dispute Settlement Body] authorization in accordance
with those procedures before suspending concessions or
other obligations under the covered agreements in response
to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the
recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period
of time.48
The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) may authorize member
countries to enforce trade sanctions for non-compliance with
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement only as a means of last resort,
at the end of the proceedings.49
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. From the Middle Ages Until 1888
Before analyzing Switzerland’s patent law history, it is
important to recall some important landmarks of the country’s
origin and examine specific features of its Constitution. The first

48

DSU, supra note 46, art. 23.
See id. art. 22; see also WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, The Panel
Process, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm (displaying,
by means of a flowchart, the various stages in the dispute settlement process) (last visited
Jan. 29, 2004). In spite of the provisions of article 22 of the DSU, the United States
continues to use its “Special 301” mechanism before any proceedings conclude. In the
proceeding commenced by the European Union, although the panel held that section 304
of the Trade Act of 1974 constitutes a serious threat to article 23 of the DSU, the
statements made by the United States before the panel removed the prima facie
inconsistencies and fulfill the guarantees required under article 23. See WTO, REPORT OF
THE PANEL WT/DS152/R ¶ 7.131 (1999), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/wto/tract40e.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
49
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or “old” confederation was founded in 1291.50 It was a union of
three confederates, each of which maintained its independent
sovereignty.51 This confederation eventually grew during the
centuries by the admission of new cantons, but remained a union of
independent confederates until its occupation by Napoleonic
France in 1798.52 This invasion transformed the confederation into
the Helvetic Republic, which had a centralized government that
vitiated the previous autonomy of the cantons.53 The unpopular
republic, viewed by the people as antithetical to the spirit of
Switzerland, was abolished in 1803.54 After a transitional period, a
new federal pact was signed in 1815, reinstalling the former
confederation—a union of sovereign states without centralized
power.55
Modern Switzerland was created in 1848, when the union of all
twenty-two cantons adopted a constitution modeled after the
American constitution, under which the cantons agreed to give up
part of their sovereignty to the confederation.56 All authority not
expressly attributed to the confederation remains with the
cantons.57 Switzerland’s legislative power is exercised by the
Federal Assembly, which is composed of two chambers: the
National Council and the Council of States, the former being the
larger one.58
50

Nationmaster.com, Encyclopedia, History of Switzerland, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/History-of-Switzerland (article last updated Jan. 6,
2004).
51
Id.
52
History of Switzerland, Swiss Revolution and Helvetic Republic (1798), at
http://history-switzerland.geschichte-schweiz.ch/swiss-revolution-helvetic-republic1798.html (last updated Dec. 30, 2003).
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
Id.
56
More precisely, the federal government now controlled the national defense, trade,
and legal affairs. History of Switzerland, supra note 52. In 1848, the cantons did not
grant any rights to the confederation with respect to patent protection. Pierre-André
Morand, Les Lois Cantonales Relatives aux Brevets [The Cantonal Laws Concerning
Patents], in KERNPROBLEME DES PATENTRECHTS 3, 4 (Institut für gewerblichen
Rechtsschutz, INGRES, Zurich 1988).
57
Morand, supra note 56, at 4.
58
Nationmaster.com, Europe: Switzerland, Government, at http://www.nationmaster.com/country/sz/Government (last visited Jan. 29, 2004).
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It is often written that Switzerland did not have a patent system
until the adoption of the patent law of 1888.59 This is not entirely
accurate, however. Prior to 1888, various patent protections
existed, although they were not very significant. In the Middle
Ages, under the old confederation, the sovereign cantons could, if
they wished to do so, grant privileges to inventors.60 Such
privileges were mainly seen in towns where intellectual,
commercial, and industrial activities flourished, such as in Basel,
where in 1531 the legislator granted protection to printed books.61
Other examples include Berne, where in 1577 privileges were
given to a citizen for his use and reproduction of original
apparatuses used to collect salt, and Zurich, where a man received
protection for a fountain.62
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Helvetic Republic,
which replaced the old confederation, enacted its first patent law.63
Article 1 of the law of 1801 allowed a citizen of the Republic who
invented, improved, or introduced from abroad a new essential
industry and practiced it in the country, to apply for a patent, which
was protected for up to seven years.64 This law, however, was
abolished with the fall of the Helvetic Republic in 1803.65 After
the transition period that lasted from 1803 until 1815, the old
confederation system was reinstated.66 Some of the sovereign
states, but not all, used their competence to enact patent legislation,
resulting in great diversity.67 In 1832, Zurich was the first canton
to enact legislation in this area, but the law appears to never have
been used.68 In September of 1837, Basel-Stadt granted protection
for inventions in its a criminal law, but never described the

59

See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 86–87.
Morand, supra note 56, at 4.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 5.
63
Switzerland’s first patent law was enacted on April 25, 1801. Id. at 7; see also Hans
Bracher, Entstehung und bedeutung des schweizerischen patentwesens [Coming into
Existence and Meaning of the Nature of the Swiss Patent], at 5, 6 (1923).
64
Bracher, supra note 63, at 5; Morand, supra note 56, at 7.
65
Morand, supra note 56, at 9; see also supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
66
See Morand, supra note 56, at 9.
67
Id.
68
Id.
60
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conditions to be met in order to receive protection.69 Solothurn
introduced patent protection in its civil code in 1847, but included
it in the chapter devoted to illicit acts.70 Finally, the canton of
Thurgovie did not pass legislation, but included in its constitution
an affirmation under which intellectual property was protected.71
In general, the protection granted appears vague and narrow,
limited to the specific canton.72 Most of the other cantons did not
legislate on this matter, mainly because they felt that patents did
not need particular protection.73 Diversity in legislation favored
the protectionism of the cantons to the detriment of the national
interest.74
This state of affairs continued until the adoption of a federal
patent law on November 15, 1888.75 This legislation, however,
was not adopted without long debates, much opposition, and
considerable compromise. As early as 1849, a year after the birth
of the federal state, a member of the Council of States submitted to
colleagues the draft of a patent law and urged them to adopt it
promptly.76 This motion was followed by a second motion in the
same year;77 however, both were both rejected, as was a petition
filed in 1852.78 The basis for the rejections was that the
confederation was not competent to pass laws in this matter
because there was no express clause in the Constitution that
enabled such action.79 As a result, in 1854, the Federal Council, at
the request of the National Council, examined the possibility of
granting such protection through a treaty, or concordat, between
the cantons.80 Despite repeated efforts over the next few years to
69

Id. at 10.
Id.
71
Id. at 11.
72
Id. at 12.
73
Other cantons that enacted legislation to protect intellectual property did not clearly
define the scope of protection and often did not extend the protection to patents. See id. at
11–12.
74
Id. at 12.
75
Id. at 16.
76
Id. at 14.
77
Id. at 14–15.
78
Id. at 15.
79
Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6.
80
Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6.
70
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implement this solution, however, it was rejected due to cantonal
disagreement.81 Further rejection of a Swiss patent regime
followed in 1863, when a new proposal was dismissed by the
government “with reference to the fact that political economists of
greatest competence had declared that the principle of patent
protection was pernicious and indefensible.”82
In 1864, Switzerland signed a bilateral treaty with France,83
pursuant to which the citizens of both countries could require of
each other exclusive protection for their trademarks as well as their
artistic and literary works.84 The treaty did not address the
protection of patents, despite France’s efforts to include it.85 The
signing of this treaty signaled to Switzerland the urgency of
enacting legislation to protect intellectual property, especially
because all Switzerland had at the time was a concordat between
some of the cantons for the protection of literary and artistic
property.86 Thus, in 1865, the Federal Assembly submitted for the
first time a referendum for an amendment to the Constitution to
grant the confederation the power to legislate intellectual property
matters.87 This proposition, however, was rejected by the popular
vote held on January 14, 1866.88
Those in favor of a national patent law did not renounce the
cause and continued to pursue their efforts both in Switzerland and
abroad. Two motions were filed by a representative of the
81

Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6–7.
Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 5 (citations omitted); see also Roland
Grossenbacher, Die Schweiz und die PVÜ [Switzerland and the Paris Convention], in
KERNPROBLEME DES PATENTRECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM EINHUNDERTJÄHRIGEN BESTEHEN
EINES EIDGENÖSSISCHEN PATENTGESETZES 389 (Institut für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz,
INGRES, Stämpfli 1988).
83
France already had enacted a new patent law in 1844. Morand, supra note 56, at 12–
13.
84
Id. at 13.
85
Bracher, supra note 63, at 8; Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 389.
86
Morand, supra note 56, at 13; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 7.
87
See Morand, supra note 56, at 15. A referendum is compulsory for all amendments
to the Swiss Constitution (“Constitution”), and a double majority is needed for the
amendment to take place. This means that both a majority of the popular vote and a
majority of the cantons in which the majority of the voters adopted the proposal are
required.
88
The proposal was rejected by a margin of 40,000 votes. Id.; see also Bracher, supra
note 63, at 7–8.
82
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National Council in 1871 and 1873.89 Both were rejected,
however, one of them on the basis that Switzerland was
purportedly too small to have patent laws.90 These setbacks did
not prevent the proponents from actively participating in the
international realm and further advocating international protection.
The advocates brought forth their cases at the two privately
organized congresses concerning patent protection held at the
Universal Exhibition in Vienna in 1873 and in Paris in 1878
(referred to as Congrès du Trocadero).91 In 1880, Switzerland was
also represented at the Paris Convention, the first diplomatic
conference regarding patents.92 Switzerland played an important
role in drafting the text of the Paris Convention, which was
eventually signed on March 20, 1883.93 This is the primary reason
why Berne was chosen as the headquarters for the Central Bureau
of the Union, which was in charge of the administration and
supervision of the convention.94
Because the text of the Paris Convention and the pending
motions were sent to the states by France in November 1880,
Switzerland was able to take advantage of the impact of the 1880
conference.95 On February 8, 1881, the National Council was
urged to submit to the citizen vote a new amendment to the
Constitution to add article 64bis. Pursuant to this new article, the
confederation would be granted the necessary power to protect
industrial and agricultural inventions as well as offer protection for
designs and models.96 In its message of support for this
amendment, the Federal Council emphasized the number of
countries that had laws concerning patent protection and that
89

Bracher, supra note 63, at 8, 16; Walther Stuber, Die Patentirbarkeit chemischer
Erfindungen [The Patentability of Chemical Inventions], in ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHT, Heft 20, at 7 (1907).
90
See Morand, supra note 56, at 14; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 8.
91
Morand, supra note 56, at 13; see also Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391.
92
Morand, supra note 56, at 13; WIPO, Paris Convention Parties, supra note 23.
93
Morand, supra note 56, at 13; Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391; WIPO, Paris
Convention Parties, supra note 23.
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Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391–92.
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From 1875 to 1881, different voices were raised in favor of a national patent law,
and motions as well as petitions were filed both at the national and states councils. See
Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391–92.
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Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 392–93; Bracher, supra note 63, at 8–9.
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favored Berne as the seat for the Central Bureau of the Union. The
National Council also warned that the absence of a patent
protection system could leave the Swiss inventors behind and
might create an exodus of highly qualified specialists.97 Despite
these seemingly strong arguments, the amendment was rejected by
the Swiss citizenry in 1882.98 One explanation is that the vote was
influenced by the fact that on the same day, the population also
voted on an unpopular law concerning the control of contagious
diseases and epidemics.99 Regardless of the reason, the negative
outcome turned out to have far more consequences than those
foreseen at the time. Indeed, up to that point, the chemical
industry had not brought about strong resistance against the
amendment because the text voted on was neutral in that it did not
contain the model requirement that existed in the version submitted
to the people in July 1887.100 The adoption of the 1881 proposal
would have saved much time and energy. More importantly, it
would have avoided the need for the second constitutional
modification, which came in 1906.101
Even though Berne was designated as the headquarters of the
Central Bureau of the Union, the reality was that Switzerland was
still without a patent law when the Paris Convention was signed in
March 1883.102 This failure, however, did not prevent the
proponents of patent protection to continue their efforts. A motion
was filed in 1883 to determine whether this question should be
submitted to the citizens once more, despite the initial negative
outcome.103 Many petitions in favor of establishing a patent law
were filed104 and, during the assembly of the delegates of the Paris
Convention in Rome in early 1886, it was requested that the
countries that did not yet protect all types of intellectual property
97

Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 393.
Morand, supra note 56, at 15.
99
Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 393 n.11; Alfred Simon, Der Patentschutz mit
besonderer berücksichtigung der schweizerischen gesetzgebung [The Patent Protection
with a Special Emphasis on Swiss Statute] 32 (1891); Stuber, supra note 89, at 11.
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Stuber, supra note 89, at 11.
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Id.
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See Morand, supra note 56, at 15.
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Id. at 15–16.
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Morand, supra note 56, at 15–16.
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should do so without further delay.105 In light of the foregoing, the
National Council again delivered a message on June 1, 1886 in
favor of the addition of article 64bis to the Constitution.106 On
July 10, 1887, the voters finally agreed by a large majority to grant
the confederation the competence to enact patent legislation.107
The powers given to the Swiss government, however, were
limited in scope because the legislation that could be passed was
limited to inventions represented by mechanical models applicable
to the industry.108 This peculiarity made Switzerland’s legislation
unique because no other country had such a requirement.109 A
better way to draft the constitutional clause would have been to
give it a broader scope, thus, allowing the legislation to carve
narrower requirements.110 This constraint was defined in article 14
of the 1888 patent law, and stated that a model of the invention
comprised any execution of the invention or any artistic
representation that clearly showed the nature and object of the
invention.111 Its main goal was to exclude chemical inventions to
avoid the strong opposition of the chemical industry, which had
challenged all other versions of the amendment.112 According to
the National Council, this requirement was supposed to have two
other advantages. First, it was intended to exclude all inventions
that were not ripe enough or for those in which the inventor was
105

Simon, supra note 99, at 33.
See Morand, supra note 56, at 16; Simon, supra note 99, at 33.
107
Morand, supra note 56, at 16.
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See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86.
109
Id. at 86.
110
Stuber, supra note 89, at 18. The author concurs with Walther Stuber that such detail
had no place in the Constitution.
111
Loi fédérale sur les brevets d’invention, du 29 juin 1888, publié au Recueil officiel
des lois et ordonnaces de la Confédération Suisse, nouvelle série, tome X, 1888, 688-689,
[Federal Patent Law of June 29, 1888, published in the official report of the laws and
regulations of the Swiss Confederation, new series, vol. X, pp. 688–89].
112
Message du Conseil fédéral à l’assemblée fédérale concernant le projet de loi sur les
brevets d’invention, 20 janvier 1888, FF 1888 I 187, 189 [Message from the Federal
Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the draft law about patentable inventions]
[hereinafter Message of 1888]; Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif
à la revision de l’article 64 de la Constitution fédérale, 13 novembre 1903, FF 1903 V 47,
49, 50 [Message from the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the
modification of article 64 of the Swiss Federal Constitution] [hereinafter Message of
1903].
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not able to fully describe the implementation.113 Second, the
model requirement was believed to facilitate procedural steps in
patent infringement disputes.114 The model requirement left out
inventions for chemical and pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs,
and stimulants.115
B. From 1888 to the Law of 1907
Soon after the patent law of 1888 entered into force, voices
were raised about the inappropriateness of the model requirement:
This restriction finds no justification in the law; indeed
there is no justification to create a special category with the
inventions that can be represented by a model; the
possibility of a model is a completely secondary
circumstance, which has nothing to do with the nature of
the invention; no substantial legal argument has been
seriously invoked in favor of the adopted system.116
Furthermore, this model requirement, which at first seemed to
have a straightforward application and was supposed to ease the
work of the Intellectual Property Office, led to uncertainties due to
its lack of clarity.117 There was an interpretation discrepancy
regarding the scope of application—more precisely, determining
which invention could actually be represented by a model.118
Since no case was ever brought to the supreme court of
Switzerland, the Tribunal fédéral suisse (Federal Tribunal), this
question remained unresolved.119 Additionally, “[d]oubts were
soon raised as to whether Switzerland, in enacting so selective a

113

Message of 1888, supra note 112; Message of 1903, supra note 112.
Message of 1888, supra note 112; Message of 1903, supra note 112; see also Simon,
supra note 99, at 55.
115
Simon, supra note 99, at 59.
116
Stuber, supra note 89, at 3 (quoting J. Spiro: “Cette restriction ne se justifie pas en
droit; il n’y a en effet aucune raison de faire des inventions représentables par modèle une
catégorie spéciale; la possibilité d’un modèle est une circonstance tout à fait accessoire et
qui ne touche en rien à l’essence de l’invention; aucun argument juridique n’a d’ailleurs
été sérieusement invoqué en faveur du système adopté”).
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law, had really met her moral obligations as a Member of the
International Union.”120
Early on, some discrepancies appeared in the three official
versions of the text—French, German, and Italian121—requiring
some minor modifications of the law, which were undertaken in
1893.122 At that time, it was not possible to drop the model
requirement because it was not only embedded in the law, but also
in the Constitution.123 A constitutional amendment, therefore, was
necessary. This process was much more burdensome because it
required a new popular vote on the legislative proposal.124 It was
only a decade later in 1904 that the Parliament agreed to submit to
the citizens an amendment to article 64bis of the Constitution that
would drop the model requirement.125 The vote was favorable, and
the change was accepted on March 19, 1905.126 The law
subsequently was changed on June 21, 1907.127
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the following
circumstances also prompted this change. First, the Swiss
government realized that based on the experiences of other
countries, it was possible to grant protection to chemical inventions
in a way that suited the Swiss industries.128 Second, it recognized
that a balanced patent law could benefit the entire economy.129
Third, it took notice of the current absence of abolitionist views in
the industrialized countries—in other words, the trend was to
improve, and not eliminate, the existing patent laws.130 In fact, it
would have been illogical to deny patent protection to the chemical
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SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 93.
Bracher, supra note 63, at 11.
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Stuber, supra note 89, at 2.
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See Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif au projet d’une loi
fédérale sur les brevets d’invention, 17 juillet 1906, FF 1906 IV 325, 326 [Message from
the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the draft of a federal law about
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industries when the other industries whose products were covered
by the existing patent law benefited from it.131
At the same time, the chemical industry had loosened its
opposition, although not completely.132 It was still opposed to
patent protection for the application processes, the methods of
fabricating pharmaceuticals, the production of food and stimulants,
as well as the products themselves.133 What also weighed in the
balance was, on one hand, the proposal made by the United States
to amend the Paris Convention by adding a clause under which
“any invention that is not patentable in the country of origin, may
be excluded from protection in any other Member country that
finds it expedient to include it.”134 This proposition was contrary
to the spirit of the Paris Convention and presumably would not
have been accepted by the majority of the members of the
European Union, but Switzerland did not want to risk the
recurrence of such proposals, or worse, acts of retaliation.135 On
the other hand, the German government did threaten Switzerland
with retaliatory measures. Specifically, the German government
threatened the imposition of custom duties on the import of certain
chemical products from Switzerland, such as aniline and other
coal-tar dyestuffs, if the patent law was not modified to include the
protection of chemical inventions by December 31, 1907.136
It is these two last circumstances which had, in reality, the
most impact on Switzerland’s decision. Professor Heinrich
Kronstein and Doctor Irene Till shed an interesting view on these
episodes of the Paris Convention that is worth citing here:
In at least one specific instance Germany did use the
International Patent Convention to cement its monopolistic
position. This was in connection with Switzerland. At the
turn of the century Switzerland loomed as a real
131

See id. at 52.
See Message of 1906, supra note 125, at 326.
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Id.
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This U.S. proposal was made at the 1897 Conference of the Union in Brussels.
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 93.
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See Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 54–55; see also SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 89–
90, 93–95.
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EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM
16–17 (1951); SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 94–95; Stuber, supra note 89, at 27–28.
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competitive threat to Germany’s dyestuffs industry; and it
persistently refused to grant patents for the protection of
chemical processes. In this case the United States came to
the aid of Germany. At the 1897 patent convention in
Brussels, the United States—with no dyestuff industry of
its own—proposed that Switzerland should be punished for
its dereliction in the chemical field by discriminatory
measures against it. Was this an expression of the
American-German patent alliance? In 1904 Germany sent
a virtual ultimatum to Switzerland, demanding that it grant
patents on chemical processes under the patent
convention’s requirement of equality of treatment to
nationals and foreigners.
To force compliance, it
threatened Switzerland with an import tariff on Swiss
goods based on the total volume of its exports into
Germany.
The Swiss parliamentary debates of 1904 and 1907 give a
dramatic account of the conflict. From one side comes the
charge that Switzerland is opposed to the grant of chemical
patents because she wishes to enrich her own industries by
securing technological developments from abroad for
nothing. The defense of those opposed to the grant of such
patents is that they inevitably lead to monopoly; and the
German dyestuffs industry is cited as the prime example.
The very fact that the German government and the German
chemical industry were demanding that Switzerland grant
chemical patents was taken as an indication that the real
purpose was to compel Swiss industry to join the German
dyestuffs cartel. History proved that this charge was
correct, for in the end the Swiss industry was compelled to
become a junior partner in the German dyestuffs group.137
Switzerland’s resistance was finally overcome. Whether this
was a welcome change depends on the viewpoint of patentees and
consumers, respectively. The new patent law clearly benefited the
patent holders and the German industry, who gained a
137

Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Reevaluation of the International Patent
Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 778–79 (1947).
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monopoly.138 On the other hand, the consumer had to pay more for
the same products once the Swiss competition was destroyed.139 It
should be noted, however, that the scope of the new patent law
adopted on June 21, 1907 was still limited because only chemical
processes were protected and not chemical products or substances
themselves.140 Furthermore, the new law excluded the protection
of all chemical processes related to the fabrication of products,
whether chemically or not, for human or animal nutrition.141 The
serien-patente on chemical processes, as well as the chemical
processed for the treatment of textile fibers, were also excluded
from protection.142 Despite the large gaps in protection, this was in
fact not the last Swiss resistance to the German industry. Section 4
of the German law in effect at that time also excluded from its
scope inventions on food, stimulants, or pharmaceutical products,
as well as chemically-produced substances, as long as the
invention did not concern a specific process for the production of
the object.143
III. THE REASONS FOR THIS OPPOSITION
A. The General Reasons
The arguments raised by the opponents were diverse, but can
be summarized and categorized as follows:
• The protection of inventions did not bring any advantages;
on the contrary, it was only giving the state more work than
necessary.144
• “The principle of patent protection is pernicious and
indefensible.”145
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See id.
See id.
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 95.
Bracher, supra note 63, at 33.
PENROSE, supra note 136, at 17; Bracher, supra note 63, at 34.
See Stuber, supra note 89, at 51.
Bracher, supra note 63, at 13.
Morand, supra note 56, at 15.
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• “[I]t is pure fantasy to believe that the protection of
inventions would result in greater activity or encouragement
of workers.”146
• “The inventing spirit . . . follows his ideas, not for gain but
driven by an inner compulsion which will not let him
rest.”147
• Switzerland was too small to have patent protection;148 such
a law would only be efficient in larger countries or
internationally.149
• A major invention was generally not achieved by the work
of one person, but was the result of the general development
in the industry, or the work of a group of inventors.150
Therefore, it was unfair to grant a patent, which resulted to a
monopoly for the inventor who was lucky enough to come
up with the last inventive step or final touch on an invention,
and reap all the advantages and economic rewards to the
detriment of the others.151
• Patents were considered useless, since Switzerland’s
industries were able to expand successfully and reach high
levels of productivity and quality without patent
protection.152
Furthermore, patents were considered damaging because they
could prevent the free use of foreign industries.153 In addition,
granting patents was seen as a hindrance to free trade.154 The
Swiss industries also feared that the enactment of a patent law
would lead to a massive importation of goods protected by
146

PENROSE, supra note 136, at 37 (citing a silk industry manufacturer’s response to a
survey published in 1886 by the Zurich Chamber of Commerce).
147
Id. (citing a pottery industry manufacturer’s response to a survey published in 1886
by the Zurich Chamber of Commerce).
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Morand, supra note 56, at 14.
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an international scale. Bracher, supra note 63, at 8, 16.
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patents.155 These views were expressed in a survey published by
the Zurich Chamber of Commerce in 1886:
The majority of the big industrialists of Zurich are not in
favor of the granting of patents. They do not wish to give
up the freedom to make use of the improvements of foreign
competitors as they see fit. Many see in the present
situation the last advantage, which remains, to them in
foreign competition and they do not wish to see it wrenched
from their hand. This is held to be the case—as we
especially set out—not only with respect to imitation but
also particularly with respect to the free development of the
play of forces. This attitude is connected, we must record
for the sake of truth, with consideration of tariff policy.156
These views were echoed in a report to the federal department
of commerce and agriculture:
Above all, people feared that it [a patent law] would
facilitate the introduction of foreign manufactured goods by
the foreign holders of Swiss patents because of our own
tariff policy, and we should expect a real flood to the harm
of our own industry.157
In response to this fear, the advocates of patent protection
enacted a working requirement and compulsory licensing:
This disadvantage is easily overcome; compulsory working
will be introduced in any patent law to be created. It is in
the contract connected with the issue of a patent that the
invention as a rule should promote domestic needs and
advance domestic technique. Without such provision half
of the present patent protection would certainly refuse their
support.158
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PENROSE, supra note 136, at 122–23.
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The patent law of 1888 did contain such requirements in article
9, sections 3 and 4. Specifically, the law stated that the patent
would be cancelled
if the invention has not been worked after the expiration of
three years from the date of the application for a patent
[and] if the patented object is introduced into Switzerland
from abroad and the holder of the patent has refused a
license requested by a Swiss on reasonable terms.159
As an alternative to patent protection, the anti-patent
movement suggested that the state should reward the inventor
through a specific fund to be established.160 A suggestion was
made in 1865 to set up this fund internationally.161 This proposal
was never implemented because it presented too many obstacles.
The first obstacle was the difficulty in raising the amount of money
necessary to reward numerous inventions.162 The second obstacle
was the question of how to ascertain the amount of the reward to
be allocated.163 This was the general view prevailing amongst all
industries in the mid-eighteenth century when the first proposition
for patent protection was introduced.164
These opinions were also widespread amongst the
parliamentarians.165 As a result, the proponents of patent law saw
many of their motions and petitions rejected for many years.166
Opinions evolved, however. The general hostility was lifted
with the economic crisis that started in Europe in 1873.167
Confronted with harsh economic times, countries tend to generate
protectionist measures such as patent protection. Switzerland’s
lawmakers realized the advantages of the patents, namely, that
patents could preserve the national industry from foreign
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competition.168 They started thinking that the absence of patent
law actually could be prejudicial to their industry.169 They also
relied on the example set by the United States which demonstrated
that a country could enact strong patent protection while achieving
a high level of development in the industry.170 The chemical
industry was not so easily convinced by these arguments, however,
and kept fighting against strong patent laws.171
B. The Chemical Industry
In addition to the general arguments raised and summarized
above, the chemical and paint industries brought up the following
contentions against a patent protection in their field:
• Based on experiences in other countries, a clear process
could not be followed to suit patent chemical substances or
chemical reactions.172
• In the chemical field it was often difficult to know who the
inventor was because chemical inventions were generally a
series of chemical reactions.173 Therefore, there was a risk
that a patent could be granted to an individual who just
stepped in at the end of the process and did not contribute a
lot of work, but simply put the final touch on the invention.
Such persons should not be entitled to reap all the benefits
and advantages of a patent.174
• Patents hindered the growth of the chemical industry.175
Unlimited freedom, as known in Switzerland, was more
favorable to the development of the industry than patent
protection.176 Germany, whose industry had a stronger
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expansion before the patent era, was an example of the
downfalls of patent law.177
• A patent application was a costly proceeding, which can be
too expensive for small inventors.178 Hence, if inventors did
not have enough funds, they had two solutions, renounce
their patent opportunity or give it to big a manufacturer.
The consequence of this cost of patenting an invention was
that the monopoly would end up, in most cases, in the hands
of the big industries and not in those of small inventors, who
would lose all the advantages that patent protection was
designed to give them.179
• In many countries, only the manufacturing process was
protected, but not the product itself.180 With certain
products, however, it was impossible to know if they had
been manufactured using the patented invention or another
process. Difficulties might have arisen, therefore, if two
competing manufacturers were making the same product,
but only one of them was using the patented process.
Money would then be lost in infringement proceedings,
instead of being invested.181
• If there were only one method of making a product, then the
patent holder would have undue power.182
• Since only the manufacturing processes were patentable, and
not the chemical reactions, it would be difficult to draw a
line between these two notions and establish whether there
was an invention.183
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Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 21. This assertion, however, is historically
untrue. German chemical industries further flourished and developed even after the
patent law was enacted in 1877. Stuber, supra note 89, at 13–14. This was most certainly
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Since the Swiss chemical industry primarily argued that it
wished to continue to freely imitate the inventions protected by
patents in foreign countries,184 this Article will briefly examine the
ethicality of such an attitude.
IV. THE QUESTION OF THE ETHICS OF THE SWISS INDUSTRIES
The moral principles underlying the attitude of the Swiss
industries toward patents can be analyzed from both legal and
philosophical perspectives. From the legal standpoint, the answer
is usually straightforward because it depends on whether the law
confers exclusive rights to the patentee. If there are no such rights
granted, the invention is available to everyone and mere copying
does not pose ethical problems. This is the same situation as when
the invention cannot be patented due to lack of novelty or any
other requirement set in the law—the invention falls in the public
domain. On the other hand, if the invention is removed from the
public domain through the grant of an exclusive property right to
the inventor, then, as with any other property right, it is illegal and,
hence, unethical to imitate it. It is important to keep in mind that
the laws under which property rights are granted usually have
effects limited to the territory of the country that enacted them. A
gap necessarily will exist if not all the countries grant the same
protection, as it was the case with Switzerland and Germany. This
is precisely what the TRIPS Agreement seeks to remedy by
providing a minimum standard of protection that the Members are
obligated to implement in their own national laws.185
The philosophical perspective offers a different theory for the
protection of intellectual property rights against piracy. This
theory is known as a natural property right, under which
184

Amongst the inventions that were invented abroad and exploited in Switzerland is
the aniline dye (“mauve”) invented and patented in England by William Perkin in 1856.
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 100. A dyeing factory in Basel started manufacturing it as soon
as 1859. Id. In the next decade, the artificial dye factories were flourishing in
Switzerland. Id. They were not only using techniques developed in foreign countries,
however, but also those processes they had realized themselves. Id. at 109–10.
Inventions made by Zenobe T. Gramme and Werner Siemens were also used by an
engineer to build generators. Id. at 105–06.
185
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1
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[a] man has a natural property right in his own ideas. Their
appropriation by others must be condemned as stealing.
Society is morally obligated to recognize and protect this
property right. Property is in essence exclusive. Hence
enforcement of exclusivity in the use of a patented
invention is the only appropriate way for society to
recognize this property right.186
This idea of a natural property right, which is not a universally
accepted principle in international law, was one argument raised by
proponents in favor of patent protection. For example, this theory
was extremely popular in France, so much that it was embedded in
the patent law of 1791.187 It was later abandoned, however,
because taken literally, it would have meant that a patent granted
on the basis of a natural right could not be limited in time, which
would have been unacceptable even to the patent advocates.188
Nonetheless, this principle of natural property right could be
used as a standard in cases of imitation:
So long as the idea of the inventor’s natural property right
influences the thinking, it is difficult to avoid the corollary
notion that imitation is unethical even when no written law
or treaty and no consideration of good international
sportsmanship forbids it. . . . When the “natural-rights” idea
is rejected, objections to imitation must be based on
grounds other than general philosophical ethics.189
The German industries recognized that the property rights to
their inventions, as well as the more general property right to their
ideas, extended beyond the geographical constraints of the German
borders.190 As such, they considered the Swiss who imitated their
inventions thieves.191 The Swiss had mixed reactions to this
accusation. Some were indifferent, emphasizing that “[the Swiss]
186
187
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industry has reached its present stage of development only because
it was able to exact tribute from the foreigner—if this is thievery,
then all our industries are thieves.”192 Others denounced such
statements, especially when German industries tried to eliminate
this “illegal” competition by paying large sums of money to the
Swiss in exchange for the promise that they would stop imitating
the German products.193 It is ironic that in this type of situation,
the thieves were actually compensated for their prior theft.194
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE UNDER THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SWISS PATENT LAW HISTORY
In the 2002 Special 301 Report of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Robert B. Zoellick indicates that more than two
years after the end of the transition period, some WTO member
countries still did not fully implement in their national laws all the
patent-related requirements contained in the TRIPS Agreement.195
Switzerland’s struggles to enact a patent law in the nineteenth
century may shed some light on these difficulties.
History shows that there are two key reasons for the
Switzerland’s delay in adhering to the TRIPS Agreement, namely,
the opposition of the industries—mainly the chemical ones—and
the constitutional and legislative requirements specific to
Switzerland.196 Despite this opposition, changes were possible due
to international pressure and adjustments in the national perception
of patent rights.197 The positive experience of other countries
demonstrated to the Swiss government and industries that a patent
system was not the “cup of sorrows” initially thought;198 when
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soundly applied, it benefited not only the industries themselves,
but also the national economy.199
Hence, the analysis in this part will focus on three specific
issues: (1) how the role of the political structure of a country can
influence the implementation of their international obligations, (2)
to what extend does international pressure have an impact on the
government of a country, and (3) whether the experience of some
nations influences the thought process of others.
A. Impact of the Political Structure
The TRIPS Agreement grants developing and least developed
countries up to ten years to implement their obligations and
introduce patent legislation in areas where such laws are absent.200
It took Switzerland fifty-eight years to enact a “real” patent law.201
Even after it did, the scope of its protection was much narrower
than that required by article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.202
Taking into account the time elapsed after the signing of the 1883
Paris Convention, it can be seen that it still took Switzerland more
than two decades to comply with its international obligations under
the convention. This argument presupposes that the patent law of
1888 was not suitable to the members of the European Union due
to its peculiar mechanical model requirement.
As suggested above, this is significantly due to the political
structure of this federal state. It took three voting attempts to
finally amend the Constitution to grant the confederation the
requisite authority.203 When the Amendment finally passed in
1886, the clause was so narrow that the Constitution had to be
amended again before the law could be modified.204 Since a
popular vote is seen as a test to gauge how the citizens respond to a
199
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particular proposal or political position, if the motion is rejected,
the government will be reluctant to immediately return with the
same amendment proposal because it would not be well perceived
by the people. This illustrates that had the TRIPS Agreement been
signed in 1883 instead of the Paris Convention, Switzerland never
would have met the requirements within the limited transition
period, of one, five, or even eleven years. Considering the
restricted subject matter of the 1888 patent law, drafted in a
manner as to overcome the opposition of the chemical industries, it
would have been totally unsatisfactory with respect to article 27 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
Some of the developing countries that are WTO members,
despite lack of full compliance with the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement, are nonetheless striving to implement the necessary
legislation, but have difficulty because of factors such as political
structure and pressure from opponents.205 India, for example, was
involved in a dispute settlement procedure initiated against it by
the United States which claimed that it violated patent protection
provisions regarding pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products by not having implemented an adequate filing system for
such patent applications.206 India argued that
[t]he Government of India’s initial preference for
establishing a “means” for filing mailbox applications
under Article 70.8(a) was the Patents (Amendment)
Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), promulgated by the President
of India on 31 December 1994 pursuant to Article 123 of
India’s Constitution. Article 123 enables the President to
promulgate an ordinance when Parliament is not in session,
and when the President is satisfied “that circumstances
exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate
action.” India notified the Ordinance to the Council for
TRIPS, pursuant to Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement,
on 6 March 1995. In accordance with the terms of Article
123 of India’s Constitution, the Ordinance expired on 26
205
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March 1995, six weeks after the reassembly of Parliament.
This was followed by an unsuccessful effort to enact the
Patents (Amendment) Bill 1995 to implement the contents
of the Ordinance on a permanent basis. This Bill was
introduced in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) in March
1995. After being passed by the Lok Sabha, it was referred
to a Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House)
for examination and report. However, the Bill was
subsequently not enacted due to the dissolution of
Parliament on 10 May 1996.207
This demonstrates that even though the willingness to fulfill
the mailbox requirement was there, political changes, such as the
dissolution of the Indian parliament, resulted in the failure to pass
the bill that would have precisely enabled India to comply with this
obligation.
Furthermore, some developing countries might have higher
priorities than implementing laws to protect intellectual property.
Factors such as being at war, political instability, or economic
struggles come into play when it comes to prioritizing legislation,
in addition to cultural differences, which might also play a
significant role. Five or ten years may be not sufficient in the face
of such circumstances. Developed countries should not be so
prompt to judge others and should exercise pressure mindfully.
B. International Pressure
Moral pressure flowing from its adherence to the Paris
Convention, with Berne being chosen as headquarters for the
Central Bureau of the Union, and direct pressure exercised by
Germany aided by the United States from 1897 to 1907 had a
significant impact on the Swiss government’s willingness to
submit a new referendum to the people to amend the Constitution
and change the law.208 The National Council took seriously the
threats of retaliatory measures, either by an increase in the tariffs
or within the Paris Convention.209 What worked for Switzerland,
207
208
209
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however, may not provide a solution for another nation. The
circumstances differ for each country. Henceforth, the hardest part
will be to evaluate the type and the amount of pressure needed to
tip the balance favorably and obtain a positive response.
Although the international pressure was important in
Switzerland’s case, history shows that it was not driven solely by
concern for the well being of Switzerland, but by Germany’s own
national concerns to protect its industries, inventors, and the
German dyestuff cartel.210 It was a clash between one “selfish”
position against another. While Germany wanted to protect its
industries, Switzerland was trying to preserve its free riders. The
same is still true today: the developed countries, including the
United States, are more virulent with their unilateral trade
measures under the Special 301 provision under the Trade Act of
1974 to fight against free riders. U.S. Trade Representative
Zoellick stated that
U.S. creativity and ingenuity improves the lives of people
all over the world. American innovators, like our scientists,
artists and writers, rely on intellectual property protection
to safeguard their inventions and creations.
Strong
[intellectual property rights] protection should also be a
priority for other countries because it will help them attract
investment and technology . . . This report reflects the
Administration’s continued commitment to ensure effective
intellectual property protection around the world.211
Only experience will show whether the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism can balance the tension between developed
countries, who want the maximum protection for intellectual
property, and developing countries, who believe that some free
riding is needed to enhance their industrialization, while
restraining pressure to an adequate level.
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C. Influence of the Experiences of Other Countries
The laws and the experiences of the neighboring countries
influenced the way the Swiss industries and government
appreciated patent protection. At first, Switzerland’s perception
was very negative—it seemed that the concept was not defined
well enough, that it was hindering the development of the
industries, and that it was restraining free trade and creating
monopolies instead.212 With time, however, Switzerland realized
that a patent law could also have advantages, that it could preserve
the national industries from foreign competition, stimulate the
development of the industries by giving incentives to inventors,
and avoid the emigration of scholars and scientists who sought
better protection for their intellectual products. It is, therefore,
important to allow developing countries—and even more so for the
least developed countries–to carve their own paths. Indeed, the
patent laws of the developed countries have evolved. They were
perfected and improved for over a century alongside the
industrialization and development of their industries. Therefore, is
it realistic to impose the implementation of minimal requirements
drafted to suit the standards of the developed countries in such a
short period of time?
CONCLUSION
Although the protagonists and the circumstances are different,
history is played anew every century. Countries with patent
protection use international treaties and other means to convince
the nations that have not yet enacted such protection to do so.
Switzerland’s experience shows that generalization is impossible,
considering that each country has its own problems, struggles, and
opponents. Perseverance, patience, and some pressure do seem to
work, however, and eventually, developing countries like
Switzerland will realize that their position is not endurable any
longer. They also will ultimately come to understand that the
disadvantages of patent protection are outweighed by the
advantages it can bring them. Such balancing takes time and
212
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involves broader economic consideration, but ultimately it comes
down to assessing the impact of granting better incentives to
national industries to invent new products as opposed to allowing
them to “rob” the inventions of other countries and, thus, reduce
the cost for the consumer.
The reality for developing the least developed countries still
resisting patent protection laws is that the most important battle in
this fight has long been solved in favor of protection. As one
commentator remarked, “Nowadays, it’s hard to find any rockribbed, dyed-in-the-wool patent abolitionists. Indeed, it is hard to
find any patent abolitionists at all. Contemporary patent policy
debates seem invariably to start form the premise that the patent
system is a ‘fait accompli.’”213 This may not be so much due to its
intrinsic virtues or advantages, rather because this system has
existed for such a long period of time:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.214
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